Abstract. The well known impossibility result of Cleve (STOC 1986) implies that in general it is impossible to securely compute a function with complete fairness without an honest majority. Since then, the accepted belief has been that nothing non-trivial can be computed with complete fairness in the two party setting. The surprising work of Gordon, Hazay, Katz and Lindell (STOC 2008) shows that this belief is false, and that there exist some non-trivial (deterministic, finite-domain) boolean functions that can be computed fairly. This raises the fundamental question of characterizing complete fairness in secure two-party computation. In this work we show that not only that some or few functions can be computed fairly, but rather an enormous amount of functions can be computed with complete fairness. In fact, almost all boolean functions with distinct domain sizes can be computed with complete fairness (for instance, more than 99.999% of the boolean functions with domain sizes 31 × 30). The class of functions that is shown to be possible includes also rather involved and highly non-trivial tasks, such as set-membership, evaluation of a private (Boolean) function and private matchmaking.
Introduction
In the setting of secure multiparty computation, some mutually distrusting parties wish to compute some function of their inputs in the presence of adversarial behavior. The security requirements of such a computation are that nothing is learned from the protocol other than the output (privacy), that the outputs are distributed according to the prescribed functionality (correctness) and that the parties cannot choose their inputs as a function of the others' inputs (independence of inputs). Another important security property is that of fairness, which intuitively means that the adversary learns the output if and only if, the honest parties learn their output.
In the multiparty case, where a majority of the parties are honest, it is possible to compute any functionality while guaranteeing all the security properties mentioned above [14, 6, 8, 25, 13] . In the multiparty case when honest majority is not guaranteed, including the important case of the two-party settings where one may be corrupted, it is possible to compute any function while satisfying all security properties mentioned above except for fairness [29, 14, 13] . The deficiency of fairness is not just an imperfection of theses constructions, but rather a result of inherent limitation. The well-known impossibility result of Cleve [9] shows that there exist functions that cannot be computed by two parties with complete fairness, and thus, fairness cannot be achieved in general. Specifically, Cleve showed that the coin-tossing functionality, where two parties toss an unbiased fair coin, cannot be computed with complete fairness. This implies that any function that can be used to toss a fair coin (like, for instance, the boolean XOR function) cannot be computed fairly as well.
Since Cleve's result, the accepted belief has been that only trivial functions 1 can be computed with complete fairness. This belief is based on a solid and substantiate intuition: In any protocol computing any interesting function, the parties move from a state of no knowledge about the output to full knowledge about it. Protocols proceed in rounds and the parties cannot exchange information simultaneously, therefore, apparently, there must be a point in the execution where one party knows more about the output than the other party. Aborting at that round yields the unfair situation where one party can guess better the output, and learn the output alone. Our understanding regarding fairness has been changed recently by the surprising work of Gordon, Hazay, Katz and Lindell [17] . This work shows that there exist some non-trivial (deterministic, finite-domain) boolean functions that can be computed in the malicious settings with complete fairness, and re-opens the research on this subject. The fact that some functions can be computed fairly, while some other were proven to be impossible to compute fairly, raises the following fundamental question:
Which functions can be computed with complete fairness?
Recently, [3] provided a full characterization for the class of functions that imply fair coin-tossing and thus are ruled out by Cleve's impossibility. This extends our knowledge on what functions cannot be computed with complete fairness. However, there have been no other works that further our understanding regarding which (boolean) functions can be computed fairly, and the class of functions for which [17] shows possibility are the only known possible functions. There is therefore a large class of functions for which we have no idea as to whether or not they can be securely computed with complete fairness.
To elaborate further, the work of [17] show that any function that does not contain an embedded XOR (i.e., inputs x1, x2, y1, y2 such that f (x1, y1) = f (x2, y2) ̸ = f (x1, y2) = f (x2, y1)) can be computed fairly. Examples of functions without an embedded XOR include the boolean OR / AND functions and the greater-than function. Given the fact that Cleve's impossibility result rules out completely fair computation of boolean XOR, a natural conjuncture is that any function that does contain an embedded XOR is impossible to compute fairly. However, the work shows that this conclusion is incorrect. Namely, it considers a specific function that does contain an embedded XOR, and constructs a protocol that securely computes this function with complete fairness. Furthermore, it presents a generalization of this protocol that may potentially compute a large class of functions. It also shows how to construct a (rather involved) set of equations for a given function, that indicates whether the function can be computed fairly using this protocol.
These results are ground-breaking and completely change our perception regarding fairness. The fact that something non-trivial can be computed fairly is very surprising, it contradicts the aforementioned natural intuition and common belief and raises many interesting questions. For instance, are there many functions that can be computed fairly, or only a few? Which functions can be computed fairly? Which functions can be computed using the generalized GHKL protocol? What property distinguishes these functions from the functions that are impossible to compute fairly? Furthermore, the protocol of GHKL is especially designed for deterministic symmetric boolean functions with finite domain, where both parties receive the same output. Is fairness possible in any other class of functions, over larger ranges, or for asymmetric functions? Overall, our understanding of what can be computed fairly is very vague.
Our Work
In this paper, we study the fundamental question of characterizing which functions can be computed with complete fairness. We show that any function that defines a full-dimensional geometric object, can be computed with complete fairness. That is, we present a simple property on the truth table of the function, and show that every function that satisfies this property, the function can be computed fairly. This extends our knowledge of what can be computed fairly, and is an important step towards a full characterization for fairness.
Our results deepen out understanding of fairness and show that many more functions can be computed fairly than what has been thought previously. Using results of combinatorics, we show that a random function with distinct domain sizes (i.e., functions f : X × Y → {0, 1} where |X| ̸ = |Y |) defines a full-dimensional geometric object with overwhelming probability. Therefore, surprisingly, almost all functions with distinct domain sizes can be computed with complete fairness.
Although only one bit of information is revealed by output, the class of boolean functions that define full-dimensional geometric object is very rich, and includes fortune of interesting and non-trivial tasks. For instance, the task of set-membership, where P1 holds some set S ⊆ Ω, P2 holds an element x ∈ Ω, and the parties wish to find (privately) whether x ∈ S, is a part of this class. Other examples are tasks like private matchmaking and secure evaluation of a private (boolean) function, where the latter task is very general and can be applied in many practical situations. Unexpectedly, it turns out that all of these tasks can be computed with complete fairness.
In addition to the above, we provide an additional property that indicates that a function cannot be computed using the protocol of GHKL. This property is almost always satisfied in the case where |X| = |Y |. Thus, at least at the intuitive level, almost all functions with |X| ̸ = |Y | can be computed fairly, whereas almost all functions with |X| = |Y | cannot be computed using the protocol of GHKL. This negative result does not rule out the possibility of these functions using some other protocols, however, it shows that the only known possibility result does not apply to this class of functions. Combining this result with [3] (i.e., characterization of coin-tossing), there exists a large class of functions for which the only known possibility result does not apply, the only known impossibility result does not apply either, and so fairness for this set of functions is left as an interesting open problem.
Furthermore, we also consider larger families of functions rather than the symmetric boolean functions with finite domain, and show that fairness is also possible in these classes. We consider the class of asymmetric functions where the parties do not necessarily get the same output, as well as the class of functions with non-binary outputs. This is the first time that fairness is shown to be possible in both families of functions, and it shows that fairness can be achieved in a much larger and wider class of functions than previously known.
Intuition. We present some intuition before proceeding to our results in more detail. The most important and acute point is to understand what distinguishes functions that can be computed fairly from functions that cannot. Towards this goal, let us reconsider the impossibility result of Cleve. This result shows that fair coin-tossing is impossible by constructing concrete adversaries that bias and influence the output of the honest party in any protocol implementing cointossing. We believe that such adversaries can be constructed for any protocol computing any function, and not specific to coin-tossing. In any protocol, one party can better predict the outcome than the other, and abort the execution if it is not satisfied with the result. Consequently, it has a concrete ability to influence the output of the honest party by aborting prematurely. Of course, a fair protocol should limit and decrease this ability to the least possible, but in general, this phenomenon cannot be totally eliminated and cannot be prevented.
So if this is the case, how do fair protocols exist? The answer to this question does not lie in the real execution but rather in the ideal process: the simulator can simulate this influence in the ideal execution. In some sense, for some functions, the simulator has the ability to significantly influence the output of the honest party in the ideal execution and therefore the bias in the real execution is not considered a breach of security. This is due to the fact that in the malicious setting the simulator has an ability that is crucial in the context of fairness: it can choose what input it sends to the trusted party. Indeed, the protocol of GHKL uses this switching-input ability in the simulation, and as pointed out by [3] , once we take off this advantage from the simulator -every function that contains an embedded XOR cannot be computed fairly, and fairness is almost always impossible.
Therefore, the algebraic structure of the function plays an essential role in the question of whether a function can be computed fairly or not. This is because this structure reflects the "power" and the "freedom" that the simulator has in the ideal world and how it can influence the output of the honest party. The question of whether a function can be computed fairly is related to the amount of "power" the simulator has in the ideal execution. Intuitively, the more freedom that the simulator has, it is more likely that the function can be computed fairly.
A concrete example. We demonstrate this "power of the simulator" on two functions. The first is the XOR function, which is impossible to compute by a simple implication of Cleve's result. The second is the specific function for which GHKL has proved to be possible (which we call "the GHKL function"). The truth tables of the functions are as follows: What is the freedom of the simulator in each case? Consider the case where P1 is corrupted (that is, we can assume that P1 is the first to receive an output, and thus it is "harder" to simulate). In the XOR function, let p be the probability that the simulator sends the input x1 to the trusted party, and let (1−p) be the probability that it sends x2. Therefore, the output of P2 in the ideal execution can be represented as (q1, q2) = p · (0, 1) + (1−p) · (1, 0) = (1−p, p), which means that if P2 inputs y1, then it receives 1 with probability 1−p, and if it uses input y2, then it receives 1 with probability p. We call this vector "the output distribution vector" for P2, and the set of all possible output distribution vectors reflects the freedom that the simulator has in the ideal execution. In the XOR function, this set is simply {(1 − p, p) | 0 ≤ p ≤ 1}, which gives the simulator one degree of freedom. Any increment of the probability in the first coordinate, must be balanced with an equivalent decrement in the second coordinate, and vice versa.
On the other hand, consider the case of the GHKL function. Assume that the simulator chooses x1 with probability p1, x2 with probability p2 and x3 with probability 1−p1−p2. Then, all the output vector distributions are of the form:
This gives the simulator two degrees of freedom, which is significantly more power.
Geometrically, we can refer to the rows of the truth table as points in R 2 , and so in the XOR function we have the two points (0, 1) and (1, 0) . All the output distribution vectors are of the form p · (0, 1) + (1−p) · (1, 0) which is exactly the line segment between these two points (geometric object of dimension 1). In the GHKL function, all the output distribution vectors are the triangle between the points (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1, 1) , which is a geometric object of dimension 2 (a full dimensional object in R 2 ). The difference between these two geometric objects already gives a perception for the reason why the XOR function is impossible to compute, whereas the GHKL function is possible, as the simulator has significantly more options in the latter case. However, we provide an additional refinement. At least in the intuitive level, fix some output distribution vector of the honest party (q1, q2). Assume that there exists a real-world adversary that succeeds to bias the output and obtain output distribution vector (q
In the case of the XOR function, this results in points that are not on the line, and therefore this adversary cannot be simulated. On the contrary, in case of the GHKL function, these points are still in the triangle, and therefore this adversary can be simulated.
In Figure 2 , we show the geometric objects defined by the XOR and the GHKL functions. The centers of the circuits are the output distribution of honest executions, and the circuits represent the possible biases in the real execution. In (a) there exist small biases that are invalid points, whereas in (b) all small biases are valid points that can be simulated. 
Our Results
For a given function f : {x1, . . . , x ℓ } × {y1, . . . , ym} → {0, 1}, we consider its geometric representation as ℓ points over R m , where the jth coordinate of the ith point is simply f (xi, yj). We then prove that any function that its geometric representation is of full dimension can be computed with complete fairness. We prove the following theorem:
function. Under suitable cryptographic assumptions, if the geometric object defined by f is of fulldimension, then the function can be computed with complete fairness.
For the proof, we simply use the extended GHKL protocol. Moreover, the proof uses tools from convex geometry. We find the connection between the problem of fairness and convex geometry very appealing.
On the other hand, we show that if the function is not full dimensional, and satisfies some additional requirements (that are almost always satisfied in functions with |X| = |Y |), then the function cannot be computed using the protocol of [17] .
We then proceed to the class of asymmetric functions where the parties do not necessarily get the same output, and the class of non-binary output. Interestingly, the GHKL protocol can be extended to these classes of functions. We show:
Theorem 1.2 (informal) Under suitable cryptographic assumptions,
1. There exists a large class of asymmetric boolean functions that can be computed with complete fairness.
For any finite range Σ, there exists a large class of functions
that can be computed with complete-fairness. For the non-binary case, we provide a general criteria that holds only for functions for which |X| > (|Σ| − 1) · |Y |, that is, when the ratio between the domain sizes is greater than |Σ| − 1. This, together with the results in the binary case, may refer to an interesting relationship between the size of the domains and possibility of fairness. This is the first time that a fair protocol is constructed for both non-binary output, and asymmetric boolean functions. This shows that fairness is not restricted to a very specific and particular type of functions, but rather a property that under certain circumstances can be achieved. Moreover, it shows the power that is concealed in the GHKL protocol alone.
Related work. Several other impossibility results regarding fairness, rather than the result of Cleve, have been published [12, 1] . However, it seems that only Cleve's impossibility can be reduced into the family of boolean functions with finite domain. The work of [3] identifies which function imply fair coin-tossing and are ruled out by the impossibility result of Cleve. Interestingly, the class of functions that imply fair coin-tossing shares a similar (but yet distinct) algebraic structure with the class of functions that we show that cannot be computed using the GHKL protocol. We link between the two criterions in the body of our work.
For decades fairness was believed to be impossible, and so researchers have simply resigned themselves to being unable to achieve this goal. Therefore, a huge amount of works consider several relaxations like gradual release, partial fairness and rational adversaries ( [10, 15, 5, 19, 4, 21] to state a few. See [16] for a survey of fairness in secure computation).
Open problems. Our work is an important step towards a full characterization of fairness of finite domain functions. The main open question is to finalize this characterization. In addition, it seems appealing to generalize our results to functions with infinite domains (domains with sizes that depend on the security parameter). Finally, in the non-binary case, we have a positive result only when the ratio between the domain sizes is greater than |Σ| − 1. A natural question is whether fairness be achieved in any other case, or for any other ratio.
Definitions and Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is familiar with the definitions of secure computation, and with the ideal-real paradigm. We distinguish between security-with-abort, for which the adversary may receive output while the honest party does not (security without fairness), and security with fairness, where all parties receive output (this is similar to security with respect to honest majority as in [7] , although we do not have honest majority). In the following, we present the necessary notations, and we cover the mathematical background that is needed for our results.
Notations. We let κ denote the security parameter. We use standard O notation, and let poly denote a polynomial function. A function µ(·) is negligible if for every positive polynomial poly(·) and all sufficiently large κ's it holds that µ(κ) < 1/poly(κ). In most of the paper, we consider binary deterministic functions over a finite domain; i.e., functions f :
* are finite sets. Throughout the paper, we denote X = {x1, . . . , x ℓ } and Y = {y1, . . . , ym}, for constants ℓ, m ∈ N. Let M f be the ℓ × m matrix that represents the function, i.e., a matrix whose entry position ( 
As a convention, we use bold-case letters to represent a vector (e.g., p, q), and sometimes we use upper-case letters (e.g., Xi, as above). All vectors will be assumed to be row vectors. We denote by 1 k (resp. 0 k ) the all one (resp. all zero) vector of size k. We work in the Euclidian space R m , and use the Euclidian norm ||x|| = √ ⟨x, x⟩ and the distance function as d(x, y) = ||x − y||.
Mathematical Background
Our characterization is based on the geometric representation of the function f . In the following, we provide the necessary mathematical background, and link it to the context of cryptography whenever possible. Most of the following Mathematical definitions are taken from [26, 20] .
Output vector distribution and convex combination. We now analyze the "power of the simulator" in the ideal execution. The following is an inherent property of the concrete function and the ideal execution, and is correct for any protocol computing the function. Let A be an adversary that corrupts the party P1, and assume that the simulator S chooses its input according to some distribution p = (p1, . . . , p ℓ ). That is, the simulator sends an input xi with probability pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. Then, the length m vector q = (qy 1 , . . . , qy m ) def = p · M f represents the output distribution vector of the honest party P2. That is, in case the input of P2 is yj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ m, then it gets 1 with probability qy j .
Convex combination.
The output distribution vector is in fact a convex combination of the rows {X1, . . . , X ℓ } of the matrix M f . That is, when the simulator uses p, the output vector distribution of P2 is:
A convex combination of points X1, . . . , X ℓ in R m is a linear combination of the points, where all the coefficients (i.e., (p1, . . . , p ℓ )) are non-negative and sum up to 1. Convex hull. The set of all possible output distributions vectors that the simulator can produce in the ideal execution is:
In particular, this set reflects the "freedom" that the simulator has in the ideal execution. This set is in fact, the convex hull of the row vectors X1, . . . , X ℓ , and is denoted as conv({X1, . . . , X ℓ }). That is, for a set
The convex-hull of a set of points is a convex set, which means that for every X, Y ∈ conv(S), the line segment between X and Y also lies in conv(S), that is, for every X, Y ∈ conv(S) and for every
Geometrically, the convex-hull of two (distinct) points in R 2 , is the linesegment that connects them. The convex-hull of three points in R 2 may be a line (in case all the points lie on a single line), or a triangle (in case where all the points are collinear). The convex-hull of 4 points may be a line, a triangle, or a parallelogram. In general, the convex-hull of k points in R 2 may define a convex polygon of at most k vertices. In R 3 , the convex-hull of k points can be either a line, a triangle, a tetrahedron, a parallelepiped, etc.
Affine-hull and affine independence. A subset B of R m is an affine subspace if λ · a + µ · b ∈ B for every a, b ∈ B and λ, µ ∈ R such that λ + µ = 1. For a set of points S = {X1, . . . , X ℓ }, its affine hull is defined as:
, which is similar to convex hull, but without the additional requirement for non-negative coefficients. The set of points X1, . . . , X ℓ in R m is affinely independent if
In particular, it means that one of the points is in the affine hull of the other points. It is easy to see that the set of points {X1, . . . , X ℓ } is affinely independent if and only if the set {X2 − X1, . . . , X ℓ − X1} is a linearly independent set. As a result, any m + 2 points in R m are affine dependent, since any m + 1 points in R m are linearly dependent. In addition, it is easy to see that the points {X1, . . . , X ℓ } over R m is affinely independent if and only if the set of points { (X1, 1) , . . . , (X ℓ , 1)} over R m+1 is linearly independent.
If the set S = {X1, . . . , X ℓ } over R m is affinely independent, then aff (S) has dimension ℓ − 1, and we write dim(aff (S)) = ℓ − 1. In this case, S is the affine basis for aff (S). Note that an affine basis for an m-dimensional affine space has m + 1 elements. for some constants a = (a1, . . . , am) ∈ R m and b ∈ R. We denote this hyperplane by:
Throughout the paper, for short, we will use the term hyperplane instead of linear hyperplane. It is easy to see that indeed this is an affine-subspace. In R 1 , an hyperplane is a single point, in R 2 it is a line, in R 3 it is a plane and so on. We remark that for any m affinely independent points in R m there exists a unique hyperplane that contains all of them (and infinitely many in case they are not affinely independent). This is a simple generalization of the fact that for any distinct 2 points there exists a single line that passes through them, for any 3 (collinear) points there exists a single plane that contains all of them and etc.
Convex polytopes. Geometrically, a full dimensional convex polytope in R m is the convex-hull of a finite set S where dim(aff (S)) = m. Polytopes are familiar objects: in R 2 we get convex polygons (a triangle, a parallelogram etc.). In R   3 we get convex polyhedra (a tetrahedron, a parallelepiped etc.). Convex polytopes play an important role in solutions of linear programming. In addition, a special case of polytope is simplex. If the set S is affinely independent of cardinality m + 1, then conv(S) is an m-dimensional simplex (or, m-simplex). For m = 2, this is simply a triangle, whereas in m = 3 we get a tetrahedron. A simplex in R m consists of m + 1 facets, which are themselves simplices of lower dimensions. For instance, a tetrahedron (which is a 3-simplex) consists of 4 facets, which are themselves triangles (2-simplex).
The Protocol of Gordon, Hazay, Katz and Lindell [17]
In the following, we give a high level overview of the protocol of [17] . We also present its simulation strategy, and the set of equations that indicates whether a given function can be computed with this protocol, which is the important part for our discussion.
The protocol. Assume the existence of an online dealer (a reactive functionality that can be replaced using standard secure computation that is secure-withabort). The parties invoke this online-dealer and send it their respective inputs (x, y) ∈ X × Y . The online dealer computes values a1, . . . , aR and b1, . . . , bR (we will see later how they are defined). In round i the dealer sends party P1 the value ai and afterward it sends bi to P2. At each point of the execution, each party can abort the online-dealer, preventing the other party from receiving its value at that round. In such a case, the other party is instructed to halt and output the last value it has received from the dealer. For instance, if P1 aborts at round i after it learns ai and prevents from P2 to learn bi, P2 halts and outputs
The values (a1, . . . , aR), (b1, . . . , bR) are generated by the dealer in the following way: The dealer first chooses a round i * according to some geometric distribution with parameter α. In each round i < i * , the parties receive bits (ai, bi), that depend on their respective inputs solely and uncorrelated to the input of the other party. In particular, for party P1 the dealer computes ai = f (x,ŷ) for some randomŷ, and for P2 it computes bi = f (x, y) for some randomx. For every round i ≥ i * , the parties receive the correct output ai = bi = f (x, y). In case one of the party initially aborts (i.e., does not invoke the online-dealer in the first round and the parties do not receive a1, b1), each party can locally compute initial outputs a0, b0 similarly to the way the values ai, bi are computed by the online-dealer for i < i * . Note that if we set R = α −1 · ω(ln κ), then i * < R with overwhelming probability, and so correctness holds.
Security. Since P2 is the second to receive an output, it is easy to simulate an adversary that corrupts P2. If the adversary aborts before i * , then it has not obtained any information about the input of P1. If the adversary aborts at or after i * , then in the real execution the honest party P1 already receives the correct output f (x, y), and fairness is obtained. Therefore, the protocol is secure with respect to corrupted P2, for any function f .
The case of corrupted P1 is more delicate, and defines some requirements from f . Intuitively, if the adversary aborts before i * , then the outputs of both parties are uncorrelated, and no one gets any advantage. If the adversary aborts after i * , then both parties receive the correct output and fairness is obtained. The worst case, then, occurs when P1 aborts exactly in iteration i * , as P1 has then learned the correct value of f (x, y) while P2 has not. Since the simulator has to give P1 the true output if it aborts at i * , it sends the trusted party the true input xi in round i * . As a result, P2 in the ideal execution learns the correct output f (x, y) at round i * , unlike the real execution where it outputs a random value f (x, y). [17] overcomes this problem in a very elegant way: in order to balance this advantage of the honest party in the ideal execution in case the adversary aborts at i * , the simulator chooses a random valuex different from the way it is chosen in the real execution in case the adversary abort before i * (that is, according to a different distribution than the one the dealer uses in the real execution). The calculations show that overall, the output distribution of the honest party is distributed identically in the real and ideal executions. This balancing is possible only sometimes, and depends on the actual function f that is being evaluated.
In more detail, in the real execution the dealer before i * chooses bi as f (x, y), wherex is chosen according to some distribution X real . In the ideal execution, in case the adversary sends x to the simulated online-dealer, aborts at round i < i * upon viewing some ai, the simulator chooses the inputx it sends to the trusted party according to distribution X
the output distribution vector of the honest party P2 in this case. In fact, the protocol and the simulation define the output distribution vectors Q x,a i , and simulation is possible only if the corresponding X x,a i ideal distribution exists, which depends on the function f being computed. Due to lack of space, we now show the definitions of the desired output distribution vectors Q x,a i without getting into the calculations for why these are defined like that. We refer the reader to [17] or the full version of this paper [2] to see how the protocol defines these requirements. 
The output distributions vectors
In case for every x ∈ X, a ∈ {0, 1} there exists a probability vector X
x,a , then the simulator succeeds to simulate the protocol. We therefore have the following theorem: 
then the protocol securely computes f with complete fairness.
An alternative formulation of the above, is to require that for every x, a, the points Q x,a are in conv({X1, . . . , X ℓ }), where Xi is the ith row of M f . Moreover, observe that in order to decide whether a function can be computed using the protocol, there are 2ℓ linear systems that should be satisfied, with m constraints each, and with 2ℓ 2 variables overall. This criterion depends heavily on some parameters of the protocols (like px, py j ) rather than properties of the function. We are interested in a simpler and easier way to validate criteria.
Our Criteria

Possibility of Full-Dimensional Functions
In this section, we show that any function that defines a full-dimensional geometric object, can be computed using the protocol of [17] . A full dimensional function is defined as follows: Recall that for a set of points S = {X1, . . . , X ℓ } ∈ R m , if dim(aff (S)) = m then the convex-hull of the points defines a full-dimensional convex polytope. Thus, intuitively, the simulator has enough power to simulate the protocol. Recall that a basis for an affine space of dimension m has cardinality m+1, and thus we must have that ℓ > m. Therefore, we assume without loss of generality that ℓ > m (and consider the transposed function From Alternative 1, checking whether a function is full-dimensional can be done efficiently. Giving that ℓ > m, all we have to do is to verify that the only possible solution q for the linear system M f · q T = 0 T ℓ is the trivial one (i.e., q = 0), and that there is no solution q for the linear system M f · q T = 1 T ℓ . This implies that the function is unbalanced for every δ ∈ R.
The proof of possibility. We now show that any function that is full dimensional can be computed with complete fairness, using the protocol of [17] . The proof for this Theorem is geometrical. Recall that by Theorem 3.1, we need to show that there exists a solution for some set of equations. In our proof here, we show that such a solution exists without solving the equations explicitly. We show that all the points Q x,a that the simulator needs (by Theorem 3.1) are in the convex-hull of the rows {X1, . . . , X ℓ }, and therefore there exist probability vectors X x,a ideal as required. We show this in two steps. First, we show that all the points are very "close" to some point c, and therefore, all the points are inside the Euclidian ball centered at c for some small radius ϵ (defined as , c) ≤ ϵ}) . Second, we show that this whole ball is embedded inside the convex-polytope that is defined by the rows of the function, which implies that all the points Q x,a are in the convex-hull and simulation is possible.
In more detail, fix some distribution X real for which the point c = (py 1 , . . . , py m ) = X real · M f is inside the convex-hull of the matrix. Then, we observe that by adjusting α, all the points Q x,a that we need are very "close" to this point c. This is because each coordinate q x,a y j is exactly py j plus some term that is multiplied by α/ (1 − α) , and therefore we can control its distance from py j (see Eq. (1)). In particular, if we choose α = 1/ ln κ, then for all sufficiently large κ's the distance between Q x,a and c is smaller than any constant. Still, for α = 1/ ln κ, the number of rounds of the protocol is R = α −1 · ω(ln κ) = ln κ · ω(ln κ), and thus asymptotically remains unchanged.
All the points Q x,a are close to the point c. This implies that they all lie in the m-dimensional Euclidian ball of some constant radius ϵ > 0 centered at c. Moreover, since the function is of full-dimension, the convex-hull of the function defines a full-dimensional convex polytope, and therefore this ball is embedded in this polytope. We prove this by showing that the center of the ball c is "far" from each facet of the polytope, using the separation theorems of closed convex sets. As a result, all the points that are "close" to c (i.e., our ball) are still "far" from each facet of the polytope, and thus they are inside it. As an illustration, consider again the case of the GHKL function in Figure 2 (in Section 1). We conclude that all the points that the simulator needs are in the convex-hull of the function, and therefore the protocol can be simulated.
Before we proceed to the full proof formally, we give an additional definition and an important Claim. For a set F ⊆ R m and a point p ∈ R m , we define the distance between p and F to be the minimal distance between p and a point in F , that is:
The following claim shows that if a point is not on a closed convex set, then there exists a constant distance between the point and the convex set. We use this claim to show that the point c is far enough from each one of the facets of the polytope (and therefore the ball centered in c is in the convex). The proof for this claim is a simple implication of the separation theorems for convex sets, see [26] . We have:
We now ready for our main theorem of this section:
If f is of full-dimension, then f can be computed with complete fairness.
Proof:
Since f is full-dimensional, there exists a subset of m + 1 rows that are affinely independent. Let S ′ = {X1, . . . , Xm+1} be this subset of rows. We now locate c to be inside the simplex that is defined by S ′ , by choosing X real to be the uniform distribution over S ′ (i.e., the ith position of X real is 0 if Xi ̸ ∈ S ′ , and 1/(m + 1) if Xi ∈ S ′ ). We then let c = (py 1 , . . . , py m ) = X real · M f . Finally, we set α = 1/ ln κ. We consider the GHKL protocol with the above parameters, and consider the set of points {Q x,a } x∈X,a∈{0,1} . The next claim shows that all these points are close to c, and in the m-dimensional ball B(c, ϵ) for some small ϵ > 0. That is: 
Therefore, for all sufficiently large κ's, py j − q
In a similar way, for all sufficiently large κ's it holds that: py j − q
Overall, for every x ∈ X, a ∈ {0, 1} we have that the distance between the points Q x,a and c is:
We now show that this ball is embedded inside the simplex of S ′ . That is: Proof: Since S ′ = {X1, . . . , Xm+1} is affinely independent set of cardinality
Recall that c is a point in the simplex (since it assigns 0 to any row that is not in S ′ ), and so c ∈ conv(S ′ ). We now show that for every facet of the simplex, there exists a constant distance between the point c and the facet. Therefore, there exists a small ball around c that is "far" from each facet of the simplex, and inside the simplex.
For every 1 ≤ i ≤ m + 1, the ith facet of the simplex is the set Fi = conv(S ′ \ {Xi}), i.e., the convex set of the vertices of the simplex without the vertex Xi.
We now show that c ̸ ∈ Fi, and therefore, using Claim 4. Assume by contradiction that c ∈ H(q, δ). We can write:
and so, ⟨Xi, q⟩ = δ, which implies that Xi ∈ H(q, δ) in contradiction. Consider the ball B(c, ϵ). We show that any point in this ball is of distance at least ϵ from each facet Moreover, for all x ∈ X, a ∈ {0, 1} and for all sufficiently large κ's, it holds that Q x,a ∈ B(c, ϵ). Therefore, the requirements of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied, and the protocol securely computes f with complete fairness.
On the number of full-dimensional functions. We count the number of functions that are full dimensional. Recall that a function with |X| = |Y | cannot be full-dimensional, and we consider only functions where |X| ̸ = |Y |. Interestingly, the probability that a random function with distinct domain sizes is full-dimensional tends to 1 when |X|, |Y | grow. Thus, almost always, a random function with distinct domain sizes can be computed with complete fairness(!). The answer for the frequency of full-dimensional functions within the class of boolean functions with distinct sizes relates to a beautiful problem in combinatorics and linear algebra, that has received careful attention: Estimating the probability that a random boolean matrix of size m × m is singular. Denote this probability by Pm. The answer for our question is simply 1 − Pm, and is even larger when the difference between |X| and |Y | increases (see Claim 4.7 below).
The value of Pm is conjectured to be (1/2+o (1) Proof: An alternative question for the first item is the following: What is the probability that the convex-hull of m + 1 (or even more) random 0/1-points in
Recall that Pm denotes the probability that a random m vectors of size m are linearly dependent. Then, the probability for our first question is simply 1 − Pm. This is because with very high probability our m + 1 points will be distinct, we can choose the first point X1 arbitrarily, and the rest of the points S = {X2, . . . , Xm+1} uniformly at random. With probability 1 − Pm, the set S is linearly independent, and so it linearly spans X1. It is easy to see that this implies that {X2 − X1, . . . , Xm+1 − X1} is a linearly independent set, and thus {X1, . . . , Xm+1} is affinely-independent set. Overall, a random set {X1, . . . , Xm+1} is affinely independent with probability 1 − Pm.
Functions that Are not Full-Dimensional
A negative result. We now consider the case where the functions are not fulldimensional. This includes the limited number of functions for which |X| ̸ = |Y |, and all functions with |X| = |Y |. In particular, for a function that is not fulldimensional, all the rows of the function lie in some hyperplane (a (m − 1)-dimensional subspace of R m ), and all the columns of the matrix lie in a different hyperplane (in R ℓ ). We show that under some additional requirements, the protocol of [17] cannot be simulated for any choice of parameters, with respect to the specific simulation strategy defined in the proof of Theorem 3.1. We have the following Theorem: 
. We can write Q x,0 as follows:
Since for every i, the point Q x i ,0 is in the hyperplane H(q, δ2), we have: 
and thus it must hold that either ∑ ℓ i=1 pi = δ1 or δ2 = 0, which implies that 1 ∈ H(p, δ1) or 0 ∈ H(q, δ2), in contradiction to the additional requirements.
The above shows that the protocol does not hold when the P1 party is the first to receive output. We can change the roles and let P2 to be the first to receive an output (that is, we can use the protocol to compute f T ). In such a case, we will get that it must hold that ∑ m i=1 qi = δ2 or δ1 = 0, again, in contradiction to the assumptions that 1 ̸ ∈ H(q, δ2) and 0 ̸ ∈ H(p, δ1).
This negative result does not rule out the possibility of these functions using some other protocol. However, it rules out the only known possibility result that we have in fairness. Moreover, incorporating this with the characterization of coin-tossing [3] , there exists a large set of functions for which the only possibility result does not hold, and the only impossibility result does not hold either. Moreover, this class of functions shares similar (but yet distinct) algebraic structure with the class of functions that imply fair coin-tossing. See more in Subsection 4.3.
Our theorem does not hold in cases where either 0 ℓ ∈ H(p, δ1) or 1 ℓ ∈ H(p, δ1) (likewise, for H(q, δ2) ). These two requirements are in some sense equivalent. This is because the alphabet is not significant, and we can switch between the two symbols 0 and 1. Thus, if for some function f the hyperplane H(p, δ1) passes through the origin 0, the corresponding hyperplane for the functionf(x, y) = 1−f (x, y) passes through 1 and vice versa. Feasibility of fairness for f andf is equivalent.
On the number of functions that satisfy the additional requirements. We now count on the number of functions with |X| = |Y | that satisfy these additional requirements, that is, define hyperplanes that do not pass through the origin 0 and the point 1. As we have seen in Theorem 4.8, these functions cannot be computed with complete fairness using the protocol of [17] . As we will see, only negligible amount of functions with |X| = |Y | do not satisfy these additional requirements. Thus, our characterization of [17] is almost tight: Almost all functions with |X| ̸ = |Y | can be computed fairly, whereas almost all functions with |X| = |Y | cannot be computed using the protocol of [17] . We have the following Claim: Proof: Let m = |X| = |Y |. Recall that Pm denotes the probability that a random m vectors of size m are linearly dependent. Moreover, by Claim 4.7, the probability that a random set {X1, . . . , Xm+1} is affinely independent with probability 1 − Pm, even when one of the points is chosen arbitrarily.
Thus, with probability Pm, the set {X1, . . . , Xm, 1} where X1, . . . , Xm are chosen at random is affinely dependent. In this case, the hyperplane defined by {X1, . . . , Xm} contains the point 1. Similarly, the set {X1, . . . , Xm, 0} is affienely dependent with the same probability Pm. Overall, using union-bound, the probability that the hyperplane of random points X1, . . . , Xm contains the points 1 or 0 is negligible. From similar arguments, the probability that the hyperplane that is defined by the columns of the matrix contains either 1 or 0 is also negligible.
Functions with monochromatic input. We consider a limited case where the above requirements do not satisfy, that is, functions that are not full-dimensional but define hyperplanes that pass through 0 or 1. For this set of functions, the negative result does not apply. We now show that for some subset in this class, fairness is possible. Our result here does not cover all functions in this subclass.
Assume that a function contains a "monochromatic input", that is, one party has an input that causes the same output irrespectively to the input of the other party. For instance, P2 has input yj such that for every x ∈ X: f (x, yj) = 1. In
